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
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
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CAMPAIGN PLAN FORMULATION AND THE DELIBERATE  
PLANNING PROCESS: LINKING THE STRATEGIC AND  
OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF WAR

CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC  
AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNERS

BY

MAJOR MICHAEL R. RAMPY

AVIATION

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES  
U. S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

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ABSTRACT

**CAMPAIGN PLAN FORMULATION AND THE DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS: LINKING THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF WAR. CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNERS** by Major Michael R. Rampy, Aviation, 46 pages.

The campaign planning process is the essential link between the strategic and operational levels of war. Since the final large unit operations of World War II, the American military has lost its expertise in campaign planning. The study examines the deliberate planning process of World War II and the contemporary Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) in relation to campaign plan formulation. The study begins with the development of a theoretical construct to analyze the campaign planning process. The study then proceeds to analyze the strategic and operational deliberate planning "process" of World War II by tracing the formulation of the campaign plan to defeat the Japanese in the Pacific theater of war. The study progresses to an analysis of the contemporary JOPS and its ability to link the strategic and operational levels of war through the process of campaign planning. A comparison and contrasting of both deliberate planning mechanisms yields insights and conclusions that are applicable to the current status of campaign planning. (KPO)

Some insights and conclusions derived from this study are: the current JOPS does not formally recognize nor adequately support the campaign planning process and that the process of campaign planning is just as important as the actual campaign plan itself. Furthermore, the study concludes that an unrestrained thought process, similar to the World War II strategic and operational planning paradigm, not a restrained thought process, like the contemporary JOPS, is a prerequisite in developing a viable campaign planning process. The study concludes with considerations and implications for a contemporary campaign planning process linking the strategic and operational levels of war in support of the operational art.



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### APPENDIX A-GLOSSARY

## SECTION I

A plan of campaign results from the war plan...According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.<sup>1</sup>

### DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Campaign planning is the essence of operational art in linking strategic aims to operational level military planning through the sequencing of major operations. Since the final large unit operations of World War II, the American military has lost its expertise in campaign planning. While campaign planning remains as important today as it was in World War II, it is not a formal part of the contemporary Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS). As a result, there is a significant difference between the joint and combined deliberate planning process of World War II and the current system in use today. It is imperative to regain that planning expertise by integrating the campaign planning process as a formal part of deliberate planning.

Furthermore, a less regimented thought process is a prerequisite in the campaign planning process. The contemporary JOPS represents a planning "system" predicated on restrained thought while the campaign planning "process" of World War II epitomizes an approach utilizing unrestrained thought. Within the contemporary JOPS, both strategic and operational level planners initiate planning after the imposition of constraints and restraints, resulting in a compromise plan from the outset. In the World War II campaign planning paradigm, planners examined all possible branches and sequels prior to the imposition of constraints and restraints. As a result, planners incorporated constraints and restraints into the campaign plan rather than

incorporating the plan into the constraints and restraints. Thus, regaining the lost campaign planning expertise requires an unrestrained approach to strategic and operational level thought.

#### LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study discusses the process of campaign plan formulation and does not elaborate on the actual execution of either campaign plans or major operations. The study orients on the deliberate planning process, in a historical and contemporary context, and does not discuss time-sensitive, crisis action planning. Recognizing that the majority of future conflicts will depend on combined operations, this study discusses both the joint and combined deliberate planning process as it impacts on campaign plan formulation. Insights obtained from an analysis of the deliberate planning process provides a basis for further evaluation of campaign planning.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The strategic level of war shapes the perspective of operational level planners. "The strategic connection challenges the operational commanders to broaden their perspective, to think beyond the limits of immediate combat."<sup>2</sup> Unrestrained thought is an imperative in the formulation of a comprehensive campaign plan. This study is significant because it perceives initial campaign planning as an unrestrained analytical thought process considering the myriad branches and sequels possible in planning for the application of military force. The initial campaign plan design is therefore unencumbered by the various restraints and constraints of budget, policy, interests of other nations, etc. At the inception, the operational level planner has the freedom to extend his thought

process beyond contemporary restraints and constraints. Unrestrained thinking liberates the planner to consider all the possibilities inherent in the operational art.

### THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS

The recent surge of interest in campaign planning is directly attributable to the Army's new AirLand Battle Doctrine with its emphasis on operational art and the operational level of war. Comprehending the essential linkage between the strategic and operational levels of war requires an understanding of the role and terminology of campaign planning in a historical and contemporary context. Equipped with a basic working knowledge of the terms and definitions related to campaign planning, one can proceed to analyze and evaluate campaign plan formulation.

Differentiating between operational art and the operational level of war is pivotal in comprehending the role of the campaign plan; one is form while the other is content. The operational level of war is "a perspective of war fighting in which tactical events are linked to strategic consequences. Hence, the operational level holds the middle ground between strategy and tactics and is usually the province of large units."<sup>3</sup> The operational level of war is a corporate perspective of warfighting focusing on the application of military forces and encompassing both theory and history.

Operational art, on the other hand, "is the vital link between strategic aims and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield...Operational art disciplines the application of military effort, seeking to ensure that every expenditure of men, materiel, and time achieves the strategic aim."<sup>4</sup> Additionally, operational art is an activity concerning the "employment of military forces to

attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."<sup>5</sup> Operational art is an individual analytical activity oriented on the application of military force while considering the contextual lessons of theory and history. Operational art incorporates the intangibles of war, friction and chance as well as the moral, cybernetic, and physical domains of war. It is the practice of theater operations.

Commanders in theaters of war and theaters of operations participate in the campaign planning process. Theaters of war are areas of "land, sea, and air which is, or may become, directly involved in the operations of war." Theaters of operations, on the other hand, are areas of war "necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations."<sup>6</sup>

The terms campaign and major operation, while related, are not synonymous. A campaign "is a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war," while a "major operation comprises the coordinated actions of large forces in a single phase of a campaign or in a critical battle. Major operations decide the course of campaigns."<sup>7</sup>

The deliberate planning process and campaign plan formulation hinge on planning in three critical areas; deployment, sustainment, and employment. At the strategic level, deployment planning is the movement of forces to a specified theater. Sustainment planning focuses on the strategic resources available to maintain a force in a specified theater. Employment planning concerns the actual forecast for committing forces in the conduct of campaigns and major operations within a specified theater.

## SECTION II

### A NEW DIRECTION IN STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING

#### OVERVIEW

Although the United States entered World War II with a variety of strategic war plans, it did not have an effective deliberate planning process linking the strategic and operational levels of war. In the interim between the two World Wars, the United States military establishment developed a series of strategic war plans, the "Rainbow 5" series. The "Rainbow" war plans hypothesized a variety of likely scenarios the United States might encounter in the event of a global war. While war planning at the strategic level attained new levels of sophistication, there was no deliberate planning process linking the strategic and operational levels of war. This inadequacy represented but one facet of problem concerning the entire planning process.<sup>8</sup>

While the services emphasized cooperation and coordination with one another, they were anything but joint in reality. The advent of the Army Air Forces in the interwar years furthered the trend of divided and autonomous services. As a result, in the decade prior to World War II, the division of military forces into three separate and distinct services represented the three dimensions of modern warfare; land, sea, and air.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, the services, the Army in particular, adhered to the prewar "code" compartmentalizing military and civilian authority. The "code" stated that civilian authorities concerned themselves with determining the "what" of national policy while the military restricted itself to the narrow parameters of "how" to implement

those policies. This strict distinction created a void between policy and military planning, hampering the overall war effort.

#### CREATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS) AND THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF (CCS)

The ARCADIA Conference of 1942 ushered in a new era in joint and combined strategic and operational level planning. Following this conference, British staff planners wrote a "Post ARCADIA Collaboration Paper" determining the definitions of joint and combined operations. Joint operations were "interservice affairs in either country" while combined operations were specific operations requiring British-American collaboration. Another result of the ARCADIA Conference was the impetus for the creation of the CCS and the JCS. The creation of the CCS was a result of British initiatives to bring order into combined planning and operations.<sup>10</sup>

The CCS represented British and American senior planners and held its first formal meeting in Washington, D.C. on 23 January 1942. At the initial meeting, the CCS, a "committee in action" developed a charter based on a combined implementation directive from President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.<sup>11</sup> The directive stated the mission of the CCS as synchronizing British and American national interests and military forces in the conduct of a global war. The CCS had a broad responsibility for "making allocations of manpower and supplies, and coordinating global military policy over five theaters of war. "The CCS system "provided a center for strategic planning for all the united nations" and did so without the encumbrance of national budgetary restraints in the initial planning stages.<sup>12</sup>

The Americans created the JCS out of the necessity to present critical joint issues to the President as well as to represent American interests in dealing with the CCS. While the JCS was not a truly unified high command, it was a progressive step in dealing with the complexity of a global war. The JCS held its first formal meeting on 9 February 1942 without an "official charter or directive," and throughout the war operated without a formalized written charter or mission statement.<sup>13</sup>

Following the creation of the CCS and JCS, the British and Americans met again in March 1942. As a result of this meeting, the allies divided the world into three distinct spheres of influence. The Americans took responsibility for the Pacific, Australia, and China under the strategic direction of the JCS. The British Chiefs of Staff were responsible for the Middle and Far East excluding China while the CCS, located in Washington, D.C., had direct strategic control for the Atlantic-European area.<sup>14</sup>

The division of the world into three spheres of influence had a critical impact on the future direction of the war. Apportioning the globe into these three spheres meant that the JCS and British Chiefs of Staff planned and conducted primarily joint operations while the CCS planned and executed primarily combined operations in the Atlantic and Europe. From the American perspective, there was not a formalized deliberate planning process linking these strategic organizations to produce campaign plans. This strategic and operational void became painfully obvious to the United States at the Casablanca conference in January 1943.

The Casablanca Conference focused attention on the American planner's lack of strategic and operational focus in addition to a general lack of planning preparation and sophistication. The large



and well prepared British military planning staff continually impressed the American contingent with their military and political acumen. The British planners' expertise in integrating political and military issues within the framework of a cohesive and articulate overall strategy caused American planners to reevaluate their strategic and operational deliberate planning process.<sup>15</sup>

The British planning contingent demonstrated that elements of national policy, other than military, had a significant influence in determining strategic aims. The "fine line between foreign policy and military policy was becoming increasingly blurred as the war went on." As a result of the Casablanca Conference, the American strategic planners realized that "military strategy had to be tailored to fit the rest of national policy, especially foreign policy."<sup>16</sup>

In the aftermath of the Casablanca Conference, the organization and techniques of the American military strategic and operational level deliberate planning process dramatically changed. General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army and a key member of the American contingent at Casablanca, recognized that certain essential changes in the strategic and operational planning process must occur. He emphasized that the initial step was reorganization within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to achieve a higher degree of staff efficiency and expertise. Additionally, General Marshall recognized the need for a closer formalized collaboration between the President and the JCS. This collaboration was essential in linking strategic and operational level planning into a cohesive whole. The President would have to take a more active part in military affairs while the military had to realize that foreign policy and political affairs could no longer be isolated from "purely military calculations."<sup>17</sup>

In addition to changes in the relationship between the President and the JCS, General Marshall advocated adoption of new and improved planning techniques within each service. General Marshall believed that the United States needed new designs and concepts in both strategic and operational level planning. General Marshall, determined to develop a more comprehensive and efficient planning system before meeting the British at the next scheduled conference, pressed for immediate reorganization. As a result of General Marshall's proposals, the JCS critically evaluated the strategic and operational deliberate planning process.<sup>18</sup>

The first step in reorganizing deliberate planning was ensuring that the services operated in an integrated, joint environment rather than as autonomous services. The JCS required each service to submit joint strategic and operational concepts in support of reorganization. Prior to this time there was no joint interaction between the Army and Navy planning staffs.<sup>19</sup>

The strategic and operational planning techniques of the early war years were inadequate for planning vast joint and combined military operations composed of large formations of land, sea, and air forces. These large operations required a more effective integrated planning process linking the strategic and operational levels of war through development of comprehensive campaign plans. The task of reorganizing the entire United States military strategic and operational planning system in the midst of global conflict was a daunting one. The impetus for a change in the deliberate planning process stemmed from a "recognition of the need for establishing a common and firmly based front" in dealing with combined planning and operations with the British. The JCS recognized the critical linkage between joint and combined planning.<sup>20</sup>

In May 1943, immediately prior to the TRIDENT conference in Washington, D.C., the JCS underwent a major structural reorganization implementing many of the changes proposed by General Marshall. The basic aim of this JCS reorganization was to "breathe new life" into the joint planning process. New agencies, divisions, and relationships between services "began to appear in the joint planning field."<sup>21</sup>

The principal achievement of JCS reorganization was increased effectiveness within the Joint Planning Staff (JPS). Prior to the 1943 JCS reorganization, the JPS was a joint committee lacking purpose, direction, and guidance as well as influence. The JPS, overworked and undermanned, lacked a specific charter for its operations. Reorganization reduced the JPS's taskings while retaining its position as a central planning committee within the JCS. Furthermore, JCS reorganization assisted the JPS by establishing a crucial new link in the strategic-operational planning process; the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC). While the JPS remained an influential joint planning staff within the JCS, the JWPC became the premier cell for strategic and operational level planning, both joint and combined.<sup>22</sup>

The JWPC "came into being as a part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff system and added tremendously to its effectiveness as interservice coordination machinery."<sup>23</sup> The JCS tasked the JWPC with developing a joint deliberate planning process linking the strategic and operational levels of war through the formulation of integrated campaign plans. The JWPC accomplished this by integrating campaign planning as a formal part of the deliberate planning process. Additionally, the JWPC advocated unrestrained thinking in the formulation of the initial campaign plan concept.

An unrestrained thought process considered all possible branches and sequels without the imposition of specific restraints or constraints. This unrestrained thought process fostered a planning atmosphere conducive to the consideration of any and all possibilities. The JWPC's initial concept development and planning was unencumbered by budget or other constraints and restraints. The result was a creative and unburdened approach to developing strategic concepts and operational outline campaign plans.

The creation of the JWPC altered the strategic and operational level deliberate planning process. The JCS recognized that only a centralized planning entity, such as the JWPC, "could tie all the elements of military planning together and call the results strategy or policy."<sup>24</sup> Henceforth, the integration of both joint and combined strategic and operational level planning became the responsibility of the JWPC. The JWPC, "designed to answer the need for timely, detailed, joint deployment and operational studies," accomplished its mission.<sup>25</sup> The JWPC consisted of three directors, representing each of the services; Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces. These directors divided planning tasks into three global spheres of influence. The "Red Team" was responsible for the Pacific and Far East, the "Blue Team" formulated plans for Europe and the Mediterranean while the "White Team" had responsibility for all other areas of the world in addition to contingency planning. Complementing these teams, the "Rainbow Team" conducted interservice air planning for all theaters of war.<sup>26</sup>

The JWPC's mission was to translate strategic objectives and concepts into viable joint Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces campaign plans. They developed "outline plans, studies, and recommendations that, upon approval at higher interservice levels, were merged into a

pattern of strategic objectives acceptable to the JCS for the conduct of the war in 1943 and beyond." Furthermore, the JWPC also became the crucial link between the joint deliberate planning process and the development of combined campaign plans.<sup>27</sup>

Accomplishing this mission required the JWPC to develop outline plans for both future campaigns and major operations in support of those campaign plans. Following a detailed analysis, the JWPC submitted strategic concepts and outline plans to the JCS for review and approval. Upon approval of the strategic concept plan, the JWPC proceeded to plan the actual theater campaign plan, including major operations supporting the campaign.

If necessary, the approved joint outline plan became the basis for further development of a combined campaign plan. This combined campaign planning went through the JCS to the CCS for final review and approval. The joint deliberate planning process, used as a foundation for combined planning, facilitated the campaign planning process. The joint and combined deliberate planning processes were essentially the same, only the strategic review and approval mechanism differed. Joint issues were the responsibility of the JCS while the CCS handled combined planning issues.<sup>28</sup>

The JWPC identified three essential joint planning components which provided a methodology for plan development. The first crucial element in the joint planning process was formulating a broad strategic concept based on the directives of the National Command Authority (NCA). The strategic concept, the basic framework of a campaign plan, linked strategic objectives with the operational means to achieve them. Following the development of a broad strategic concept, the JWPC coordinated joint staff work between the services to refine the strategic concept and develop supporting plans.

Refinement of the initial strategic concept produced a campaign plan designed to achieve the strategic aims. Upon completion of the campaign plan, the JWPC began detailed planning for major operations within the overall campaign plan framework. The result of planning major operations in support of the campaign plan was an outline plan. JWPC approved strategic outline plans gave operational planners a "starting point" in the planning of more detailed operations within their regional areas.<sup>29</sup>

Following the TRIDENT Conference, the American planning staff prepared an after action report reflecting the optimism they had in the new joint deliberate planning process. While the joint deliberate planning process adequately supported combined planning, the JWPC felt that more work on the combined planning mechanism was necessary. The JWPC after action report from the TRIDENT conference revealed this new emphasis. "Now that we have developed a system for joint planning which proved its worth during the TRIDENT conferences and which will further improve with experience, steps should be taken to improve combined planning." The JWPC felt that joint and combined campaign planning were not separate issues but inextricably linked and supportive of one another.<sup>30</sup>

As the Allies transitioned to the strategic offensive in late 1943, JWPC planners identified the need to centralize strategic and operational level planning. "The transition to the initiative appeared to present the opportunity as well as the compulsion to define with greater certainty the main outlines of subsequent operations and to make more dependable estimates of how many trained and equipped units would be required." Centralization of the deliberate planning process allowed the JWPC to synchronize the actions of campaign plans in every theater of war toward achievement

of the strategic objectives. This centralization of strategic and operational level planning paid off at the next major Allied conference. The recently reorganized American planning contingent, in particular the JWPC, was responsible for the successful American presentations at the TRIDENT Conference in Washington, D.C. in May of 1943. The success of the American planners at the TRIDENT Conference ushered in a new era in joint and combined strategic and operational level planning.<sup>31</sup>

### SUMMARY

The Casablanca Conference was the pivotal point for American strategic and operational level planning in World War II. The foundation for the massive JCS reorganization of 1943 was the failure of American joint strategic and operational planning process at Casablanca. The conference revealed systemic problems within the American deliberate planning process and identified the campaign planning process as essential in linking the strategic and operational levels of war. As a result, the JCS, pressured by General Marshall, completely reorganized the joint planning process. For the remainder of the war, the American strategic and operational planning process reflected the impact of the British "models, patterns, and performance."<sup>32</sup>

Furthermore, the JCS reorganization centralized strategic and operational planning and integrated campaign planning as a formal part of the deliberate planning process. The crucial new element in this planning centralization was the JWPC. At the TRIDENT Conference, the JWPC took the lead as the primary participant for this and all subsequent high level meetings and international conferences. The mission of the centralized strategic and operational planning process

was the elimination of as many joint and combined planning problems as possible, thereby easing the intra-theater planning burden. The operational level planners benefitted the most from the concepts, studies, and plans developed by the JWPC.

The JWPC consistently provided operational level planners with detailed joint and combined studies. These exhaustive studies addressed the complexities involved in campaign and major operational planning and contained a sizable area of joint and combined agreement. Strategic concepts, as well as campaign and outline plans produced by the JWPC, gave theater commanders and their staffs a "starting point" for further detailed planning. An approved JWPC strategic concept or outline plan represented untold hours of joint and combined planning interaction.

The JWPC created a solid strategic and operational planning foundation for synchronizing campaigns and major operations around the globe. The JWPC, initially a product of the CCS system, served as the critical link in strategic and operational level planning between the JCS and the CCS. The JWPC's success in reorganizing the joint deliberate planning process led to improvements in combined planning. The JWPC represented a "compromise between two divergent tendencies, one toward simply representing national interests and views and the other toward insuring close British-American cooperation in winning the war."<sup>33</sup> As a result, the JWPC was the critical link in the deliberate planning process for the formulation of both combined and joint campaign plans.

The JWPC relied on unrestrained thinking in its initial conceptualization of strategic concepts and outline campaign plans. This unrestrained thought process produced imaginative and comprehensive outline campaign plans covering a multitude of branches



and sequels. Initially, the JWPC analyzed all foreseeable possibilities without regard to constraints and restraints. Following refinement of the outline campaign plan, the JWPC integrated political, budgetary, and logistical constraints and restraints. The result of this deliberate planning process was an outline campaign plan incorporating constraints and restraints after a consideration all possible branches and sequels from a joint and combined perspective.

The presence of the JWPC strengthened the position of the CCS and JCS, in integrating foreign and domestic policy with military operational planning. Thus, the campaign planning process was not a purely military endeavor. By the end of 1943, the JWPC largely corrected the strategic and operational planning problems evident at Casablanca. Between 1943 and 1945 the JWPC prepared over one thousand strategic concepts and outline campaign plans.

### SECTION III

#### THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS—A CAMPAIGN PLANNING PARADIGM

##### EUROPE AND THE CCS

The JWPC balanced its planning effort between the requirements of both joint and combined campaign planning. The European theater of war, under the strategic direction of the CCS, represented a primarily combined planning environment. The JWPC "developed outline plans, studies, and recommendations that...merged into a pattern of strategic objectives acceptable to the JCS for the conduct of the war in 1943-44."<sup>34</sup>

Upon JCS approval, the JWPC's outline plans and studies were sent to the CCS for review and incorporation into the combined strategic and operational planning. The JWPC advocated concentration on a combined planning effort for a cross-channel invasion in 1944. As a result of the JWPC's intensified planning efforts, the CCS committed to a cross-channel invasion of Europe in 1944 at the TRIDENT Conference. Furthermore, the JWPC coordinated with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) planners in the development of combined outline campaign plans and studies. As a result, the JWPC played an important supporting role in the European theater of war. While the JWPC supported campaign planning and major operations planning in all theaters of war, it was most influential in the Pacific where the JCS had direct strategic responsibility for the conduct of operations. As a result, the JWPC played its largest and most important role in strategic and operational planning for the Pacific theater of war.

#### THE PACIFIC AND THE JCS

While the war against Germany remained the first priority, the war in the Pacific against Japan was increasing in importance. Prior to the TRIDENT conference, long range strategic planning for the Pacific consisted of "equal parts of tactical opportunism and abstract geopolitical theory." There was clearly no long term strategic and operational direction in the Pacific prior to the spring of 1943. The JCS reorganization changed the deliberate planning process, as well as the command and control arrangement for the Pacific theater of war, creating a planning challenge for the JWPC.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to changes made in the deliberate planning process by the JCS, there was a parallel reorganization in the command and control for theater operations in the Pacific. This command and control reorganization had a significant impact on strategic and operational planning. Within the Pacific, the JCS established a new theater of operations; the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA). Establishment of the POA theater of operations signaled a new era in the war against Japan. Admiral Nimitz, newly appointed Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), became a co-equal of General MacArthur, Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific Area (CINCSWPA). The JCS and the JWPC had to balance the objectives and major operations of two parallel campaign plans a similar strategic aim, the defeat of Japan. These two Pacific theaters of operations, under strategic control of the JCS, were responsible for planning a "double barreled" advance in the Pacific terminating with the defeat of Japan.<sup>38</sup>

The POA theater was unique in many respects. In terms of space, the POA was the largest theater involving American forces in World War II. Additionally, it represented a truly joint command and control structure not evident in other major theaters. The POA theater complied most nearly with the JCS directive of 1943 for "Unified Command for U.S. Joint Operations."

The command and control structure for the POA differed from two other major theaters; SHAEF in Europe and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), in a few critical respects. Neither SHAEF nor SWPA was organized as joint headquarters in compliance with the JCS directive of 1943. The composition of SHAEF essentially reflected an Army ground staff primarily oriented on combined operations. As a result of its overwhelming Army composition, SHAEF conducted its planning on

a "consultation" basis with the other services and nations. This emphasis on "consultation" reflected the nature of a combined theater of war.

SWPA, similar in organization to SHAEF, did not have a joint staff to conduct integrated planning. Both SHAEF and SWPA relied on liaison officers to conduct whatever joint and combined planning was necessary. Within General MacArthur's headquarters in SWPA "joint" planning was the province of a single Army officer. SHAEF and SWPA were similar in their "vertical" organizational structure in which the Army held the highest and most influential position.<sup>37</sup>

The POA theater headquarters contained an integrated, joint planning staff appointed by Admiral Nimitz. Planning for joint and combined operations within the POA was critical. Virtually every operation required synchronizing all three services and forces of other nations. The synchronization of naval air, surface and sub-surface elements, Army and Marine ground forces, and strategic air assets from the Army Air Forces was the rule not the exception in the POA. For this reason, the joint campaign planning process of CINCPAC reflects the most "joint" American force planning achieved during the course of World War II.

The JWPC urged the JCS to adopt a structured and coordinated campaign plan against Japan. The joint committee insisted that strategic and operational level planning for the Pacific synchronize the efforts of the two major theaters in the Pacific: POA and SWPA. While the JWPC began as an advisory planning committee, it was soon planning campaigns and major operations for the JCS and Pacific theater commanders. The JWPC's critical role was developing campaign and major operational outline plans to assist operational level planners with further detailed planning.

At the TRIDENT Conference the Americans finally developed a cohesive strategy for the defeat of Japan. The strategic concepts and designs, approved by the JCS for the Pacific, were the result of the JWPC's efforts. The central theme of operations against Japan was a strategy of "flexibility." This policy of "flexibility" coordinated the parallel campaigns of the POA and SWPA theaters to achieve the overall strategic aim of defeating Japan. The JWPC delineated the courses that each of the parallel campaigns would take.<sup>38</sup>

Initially, JWPC planning envisioned the two theaters merging at Formosa to consolidate for the final campaign against Japan. The parallel campaigns would each achieve theater objectives while supporting one another in pursuance of the dominant strategic aim. The main effort would shift between the two theaters based upon the strategic planning emphasis of the JCS and JWPC. In this manner, both theaters assumed supporting as well as primary roles depending upon the timing of major operations in the Pacific. The JCS believed that transferring strength between SWPA and CINCPAC would keep the Japanese off balance and enhance the element of operational surprise. In June of 1944, the JCS issued a planning directive to CINCPAC and CINCSWPA specifying the objectives for each theater. While planning within SWPA oriented on a series of major operations leading to the recapture of the Philippines, CINCPAC planning focused on a series of major operations in the Central Pacific to seize airfields for the strategic bombing offensive against Japan.<sup>39</sup>

The mission of the JWPC in the Pacific was threefold: first, develop and refine the campaign plans for both theaters; second, develop and refine major operations planning to support the dual campaign plans; and third, synchronize major operations of both SWPA and CINCPAC in time and space. This synchronization of time and space

considerations was crucial in keeping the Japanese off-balance. The objective of both campaign plans was to create the preconditions for the invasion and final defeat of Japan. The JWPC was now the critical link between strategic and operational level planning and performed admirably for the remainder of the war.

#### THE JWPC AND CAMPAIGN PLAN DEVELOPMENT

Following reorganization of the deliberate planning process, the majority of campaign and major operation planning became centralized at the strategic level within the JWPC. The JWPC was the primary planning cell responsible for translating strategic guidance into operational campaign plans. This single committee, working within the JCS, developed both campaign and major operations plans at the strategic level. After the JWPC forwarded an outline plan to a theater level planner, very few details changed by the time of actual execution. In this manner, the JWPC controlled centralized campaign and major operations planning and served as the critical link between the strategic and operational levels of war.

As the American success in the Pacific increased in 1944 strategic planners, the JWPC in particular, faced a two-sided dilemma. The dilemma was the designation of a main effort between the two Pacific theaters of operations: SWPA and POA. To solve this planning dilemma, the JCS tasked the JWPC to develop plans for two related yet separate campaigns. The first campaign plan would establish the preconditions for the invasion of Japan while the second campaign plan would deal with the actual invasion of the Japan.<sup>40</sup>

The JWPC completed a series of detailed strategic concept studies of Pacific strategy by June 1944. Although initially

considering only a strategic bombing operation against Japan, the JWPC concluded that only a ground invasion would achieve the strategic aim of completely defeating the Japanese. In the summer of 1944 the JWPC finalized campaign planning in the Pacific.

The key strategic and operational study completed by the JWPC in June 1944 was #476. The primary objective of #476 was to establish the preconditions for ground invasion of Japan through the Central Pacific axis. Once refined, this concept study became the approved campaign plan for both the POA and SWPA theaters of operation. It outlined in considerable detail the campaign against Japan in three phases beginning in April 1945.<sup>41</sup>

The JWPC used the JCS planning format in the construction of an outline campaign plan. Initial planning did not include the imposition of budgetary or other restraints and constraints. The JWPC, unrestrained in its initial thought process, initiated campaign planning with the JCS format as a guide.

- (1) Mission
- (2) Assumptions
- (3) Enemy Situation
- (4) Physiography, Installations and conditions
- (5) Strategic Considerations
- (6) Course of Action (COA) comparison
- (7) Outline of operations
- (8) Logistics considerations
- (9) Selection of initial target dates

The plan addressed all three planning parameters necessary in formulating a comprehensive campaign plan: deployment, sustainment and employment of forces.<sup>42</sup>

The strategic considerations contained within #476 were that the Ryukyu islands held a strategic geographical location in relation to Formosa, China, and Japan, and the relative air distances gained by seizure of the Ryukyu islands would improve strategic bombing of Japan. Furthermore, severing of Japanese sea lines of communications

(SLOC's) in the East China Sea would seriously disrupt Japanese supply lines in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan while the seizure of the Ryukyus facilitated domination of the East China Sea by the US Fleet. The final strategic consideration was that seizure of land bases in the Ryukyus facilitated fighter escort operations in the strategic bombing offensive against Japan.<sup>43</sup>

Following the strategic considerations was a proposed time-phasing of operations within the campaign plan. Phase I (1 April-30 June 1945) envisioned American forces seizing airfields and anchorages in the Bonin and Ryukyu islands. Phase II (30 June-30 September 1945) comprised the consolidation and exploitation of these positions in preparation for an assault on the Japanese home islands. Phase III (30 September-31 December 1945) constituted the invasion of Japan with forces ashore on the island of Kyushu by 1 October 1945. By 31 December 1945, JPS #476 envisioned American forces ashore on the main Japanese island of Honshu.<sup>44</sup>

In July 1944, the JCS approved strategic concept #476. They forwarded it to CINCPAC and CINCSWPA as a foundation for further detailed intra-theater employment planning. Following refinement of #476, the basic campaign plan, the JWPC developed outline plans for major operations plans in support of campaign plan objectives. In late 1944, as a result of this planning, the JWPC produced outline plan #116/4. JWPC outline plan #116/4 addressed the final major operation of CINCPAC's campaign to isolate Japan. Following JCS approval, the JWPC sent it to CINCPAC and CINCSWPA in JCS Directive #713/19, titled "Future Operations in the Pacific." This detailed outline plan covered the seizure of the Ryukyu islands, with an initial target date of 1 March 1945, as a precondition for the beginning of the final campaign against Japan.<sup>45</sup>



The JWPC translated strategic objectives into operational terms and objectives for theater planners. The mission, as stated in JWPC #116/4 was to:

seize and develop such islands in the RYUKYU ISLANDS as can be utilized most profitably for basing air and naval forces, in order to intensify the sea and air blockade of JAPAN; to maintain and extend air and naval pressure; to support the pre-invasion aerial softening of KYUSHU and to augment the aerial neutralization of FORMOSA.<sup>46</sup>

The key assumptions used by the JWPC in developing #116/4 were that the Leyte-Surigao area would be occupied as a result of operations in SWPA commencing 20 October 1944 and that crucial positions in Luzon would be occupied as a result of operations commencing December 1944. Additionally, the planners relied on the seizure of Iwo Jima in the Bonin islands and the fact that Formosa would remain under Japanese control to guide their efforts. The remaining assumptions were that the defeat of Germany was imminent, Russia and Japan would continue a neutral relationship, visual long range (VLR) bombardment operations would continue against Japan, and finally that China, east of Canton-Kweilin-Ichang-Paotow, would be under control of Japanese forces.<sup>47</sup>

The JCS sent copies of outline campaign plan #476 and major operations plan #116/4 to CINCPOA and CINCSWPA for evaluation. Upon receipt of the plans, theater planners began internal studies to evaluate the merits of both the campaign plan and the major operations plan. CINCPOA completed its staff analysis of both plans in October 1944. CINCPOA adopted #476 as its campaign plan without any substantive changes. Simultaneously, the POA staff accepted JWPC outline plan #116/4 as its major operations plan for the seizure of the Ryukyus islands.

The POA staff, relying on JWPC #476 and #116/4, developed an operation plan (OPLAN) for final major operation of the planned campaign, the seizure of the Ryukyus islands. The POA staff's assumptions for this OPLAN were nearly identical to those proposed in JWPC #116/4. The assumptions were that the Central Pacific theater was the main effort with support from SWPA, that by 1 March Iwo Jima would be neutralized and able to support the Ryukyus operation with naval and land based aircraft, and that no ground forces from the Iwo Jima operation would participate in the Ryukyus invasion.<sup>48</sup>

On 25 October 1944 CINCPOA approved the staff study based on JWPC #116/4 and issued OPLAN #14-44, (ICEBERG-Seizure of the RYUKYU Islands), to subordinate commands. The similarity of the assumptions and mission statement between JWPC #116/4 and CINCPOA OPLAN #14-44 (ICEBERG) indicate the reliance that theater planning staffs placed on the strategic and operational plans developed by the JWPC.<sup>49</sup>

The acceptance of the campaign plan by both CINCPOA and CINCSWPA meant that the JCS, in particular the JWPC, would sequence the timing between three major operations supporting the initial campaign plan. These three major operations were the seizure of Luzon by SWPA, and the seizure of Iwo Jima and the Ryukyu islands, of which Okinawa is the largest, by CINCPOA to establish the preconditions for the invasion of Japan. At the end of the ICEBERG operation American planners would have three basic options; bomb and blockade Japan into submission, conduct a direct ground invasion of the Japanese home islands, or employ the highly secret atomic bomb. World War II ended only weeks after the success of the ICEBERG operation.<sup>50</sup>

The entire joint and combined deliberate planning process developed by for World War II began to disintegrate immediately after the war. Additionally, the campaign planning process, so vital

to the successful prosecution of the war, was no longer perceived as necessary. Following the defeat of Japan and the end of World War II, the CCS and the JWPC were disbanded. The result was a growing vacuum in "international collaboration" as problems could no longer be easily divided into military and political spheres.<sup>51</sup>

The era of peace following the war proved to be more complex than the war itself. American strategic and operational level planners made the shift from "the period of pre-war isolationism to the era of intensive wartime coalition experience," but security in the postwar world required a different form of strategic and operational level planning. The American planning process, "on the threshold of a new era...would begin to demobilize the wartime Army and prepare to meet the challenges of victory and peace." The lack of a war forced the sophisticated joint and combined campaign process to the verge of extinction.<sup>52</sup>

#### SUMMARY

Campaign planning was an integral and formalized part of the strategic and operational deliberate planning process. As a result of the 1943 JCS reorganization, there was an official relationship between the deliberate planning process and formulation of campaign plans. The campaign plan served as the link between the strategic and operational levels of war. Furthermore, joint and combined campaign plans established the framework for detailed development of major OPLANS to secure strategic aims. The success of the JWPC in developing a joint campaign planning process extended to the combined planning arena. The campaign plan fulfilled a critical planning role in the strategic and operational level planning process.

The JWPC received strategic guidance from the JCS and translated that guidance into strategic concept plans. Upon approval of the strategic concept plan the JWPC developed outline campaign plans designed to achieve strategic aims. Additionally, the JWPC developed outline plans for the major operations within the overall campaign plan framework to guide operational level planners in developing more detailed plans. Once approved by the JCS, the JWPC forwarded the outline campaign plans to the theater commanders in the form of a JCS Directive. The purpose of the JCS directive was to allow theater commanders to begin the operational planning process as soon as possible.

The JWPC was the crucial link between the JCS and the CCS in coordinating global military strategic and operational level planning. The JWPC, a single joint planning committee within the JCS, coordinated strategic and operational level planning between all theaters of war involving American forces. In this manner, the JWPC synchronized campaign planning world wide to achieve the strategic aims delineated by the NCA through the JCS.

Upon receipt of a JCS planning directive, theater commanders and staffs conducted an independent study of the campaign and outline plans. The theater planners then updated the plans according to changes in the current situation. Upon completion of this review and updating process, theater commanders issued an operations plan (OPLAN) to subordinate commands.

The centralized planning process at the strategic level facilitated the synchronization of global warfare through the sequencing of campaigns and major operations. The centralized planning process overcame major joint and combined issues at the strategic and operational levels of war. Furthermore, the JWPC's

campaign and outline plans gave theater commanders a "starting point" for development of more detailed employment plans. The campaign outline plans published by the JWPC covered all three critical aspects of planning: deployment, sustainment and employment of forces in the theater.

The JWPC's success in campaign planning was due, in part, to the application of unrestrained thinking in the initial strategic concept and campaign plan formulation. Restraints and constraints, such as the budget, did not hamper their initial strategic concept development nor the outline of the initial campaign plan. The JWPC conducted an exhaustive analysis of all possible branches and sequels prior to the encumbrance of myriad restraints and constraints. The JWPC's unrestrained thought was the crucial element in a planning process that did not predicate its planning upon restraints and constraints; rather, it incorporated those encumbrances into the comprehensive campaign plan framework. The use of unrestrained thinking resulted in over one thousand imaginative strategic concepts and campaign plans by the end of the war.

#### SECTION IV

#### CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

#### THE JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS)

#### OVERVIEW

The Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) is the "DOD-directed, JCS-specified system for the conduct of the joint planning process." It is the contemporary planning process used to construct all joint plans within the Department of Defense. As a system, the JOPS is "basically intangible; it consists of process and

procedures." The JOPS is driven by a budgetary process known as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The Department of Defense introduced the PPBS in 1962 as the "formal process for making resource allocation decisions" at the strategic level of war. The charter of the PPBS is to allocate resources and make budgetary decisions based on the identification of the "warfighting capabilities needed to meet the threat posed to U.S. security interests."<sup>53</sup>

At the strategic level, issuance of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) begins the deliberate planning process within the JOPS. The JSCP assigns tasks to unified and specified commands and also instructs the operational commanders "how to use the output from the PPBS."<sup>54</sup> Thus, budgetary restraints and constraints hamper unrestrained thinking in campaign plan development at the outset of the contemporary deliberate planning process.

Within the JOPS there are two planning parameters for development of joint military operations; the deliberate planning process and the time-sensitive planning process described in the Crisis Action System (CAS). While the Crisis Action System is an important part of the planning process it is not applicable to the deliberate planning required in the development of campaign plans and will not be discussed in detail. The JOPS is a relatively new planning process designed to establish standards and parameters for the "development, review and execution" of regional operation plans. It consolidates all essential guidance and procedures for the development, review, and approval of joint military force planning. The deliberate planning process focuses primarily on solving the myriad strategic mobility complexities involved in deploying and sustaining forces.<sup>55</sup>

The JOPS produces two primary documents: operation plans (OPLANS) and concept plans (CONPLANS). An OPLAN is a an operation plan in the complete JOPS formal format while a CONPLAN is an abbreviated operations plan, published in a concept format, that requires expansion into an OPLAN prior to execution. The contemporary definition of an OPLAN and a CONPLAN is "a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession." The basis for an OPLAN or CONPLAN is a series of assumptions. These "stated assumptions," in the form of a directive from higher headquarters to subordinate commands, constitute the basis for further planning. Therefore, an OPLAN or CONPLAN provides a basis for planning future operations.<sup>56</sup>

The documentation for the JOPS resides in four complementary volumes. JOPS Volume I (Deliberate Planning Procedures) is an unclassified document pertaining to deliberate planning procedures. Volume I issues "guidance and administrative procedures for developing, coordinating, disseminating, reviewing, and approving joint operation plans during peacetime." Additionally, JOPS Volume I dictates the standard formats and minimum content requirements for all OPLANS and annexes. The JOPS Volume II (Supplementary Planning Guidance) is a functionally oriented, classified document dealing with the issuance of planning guidance and procedures for specified classified topics. Volume II augments Volume I with sensitive information and procedures for detailed deliberate planning.<sup>57</sup>

The JOPS Volume III (ADP Support) is an unclassified document concerning computerized support for the JOPS. Volume III contains the entire range of automated data, both hardware and software, that the JOPS relies on in construction of OPLANS and CONPLANS. Additionally, Volume III outlines the critical Worldwide Military Command and

Control System (WWMCCS) that supports the JOPS. The JOPS Volume IV (Crisis Action System) is an unclassified document outlining the procedures for conducting joint planning in a time-sensitive crisis planning situation.

### THE DELIBERATE PLANNING CYCLE

Within the JOPS, plan development is continuous and terminates only upon cancellation or execution of an OPLAN or CONPLAN. The development of OPLANS and CONPLANS occurs in "five formal phases" of production. These five phases are Initiation, Concept Development, Plan Development, Plan Review, and Supporting Plans.<sup>58</sup>

#### Phase I-Initiation

The first phase in the deliberate planning process is the Initiation Phase. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) translates guidance from the National Command Authority (NCA) into strategic objectives for operational planning. The result of the JSPS process is the formulation of a primary planning document; the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides planning guidance in addition to identification of force allocations and outlining military strategy. The JCS uses the JSCP to assign missions to theater commanders and define the depth of planning required to accomplish those missions. Furthermore, through the JSCP, the JCS allocates both forces and resources to support assigned missions.<sup>59</sup>

#### Phase II-Concept Development

The concept development phase encompasses all factors that significantly affect mission accomplishment. The theater commander



analyzes missions and issues preliminary planning guidance for the staff to develop courses of action (COA). Each COA covers critical information relative to the Threat forces, friendly force capabilities, and pertinent political aspects bearing on the theater. The commander evaluates the COA's, decides on the best COA available and issues the Commander's Estimate. This estimate includes the mission, situation and courses of action, analysis of opposing courses of action, comparison of own courses of action, and a final decision. Upon issuance of the Commander's Estimate, the selected COA becomes the basis for a concept of operations. The concept of operations is a "broad narrative statement of how the supported commander expects to allocate, deploy, employ, and support his forces." The end result of the plan development phase is the production of a rudimentary OPLAN or CONPLAN in the JOPS standardized format.<sup>60</sup>

### Phase III-Plan Development

The plan develops into a basic format with supporting annexes during this phase of the deliberate planning process. The planning attempts to answer all possible questions pertaining to a critical items list. The elements composing this critical items list are: force planning, support planning, transportation planning, transportation feasibility analysis, and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The result of the plan development phase is the documentation of the basic plan with all annexes. The theater commander forwards the documented plan to the JCS for "review and approval."<sup>61</sup>

#### Phase IV-Plan Review

The JCS reviews the documented plan for scope and content as well as adherence to the initial guidance provided by the JSCP. Following a thorough review, the JCS formally approves the plan with any required revisions.

#### Phase V-Supporting Plans

The JOPS requires supporting commanders to submit their supporting plans to the basic OPLAN or CONPLAN within sixty days of JCS approval of the plan. The completed OPLAN or CONPLAN, with its supporting plans, constitutes a series of plans that articulate a specified joint operation. Although not a formal part of the deliberate planning process, maintenance of the plan is essential in maintaining a current and viable plan. Theater staffs update the plan periodically for any changes in force requirements, changes in the political situation, and any other refinements necessary to keep the plan viable.

#### SUMMARY

Campaign planning is not formally integrated into the JOPS system. While the JOPS is an exhaustive process for the formulation of joint OPLANS and CONPLANS, it does not recognize campaign planning as a formal part of its structure in the deliberate planning process nor does it address combined planning. The JOPS deliberate planning process is driven from bottom rather than from the top. As a result, the development of OPLANS and CONPLANS comes prior to any thought of how they fit in the overall framework of a campaign plan.

The JOPS deliberate planning cycle is driven by budgetary restraints and constraints. Strategic and operational level planners begin the planning process with restrained rather than unrestrained thought. The result is an OPLAN or CONPLAN that represents a compromise solution before the problem is thoroughly analyzed. Furthermore, the focus of the JOPS is on deployment and sustainment planning rather than on actual employment planning. As a result, the JOPS does not address all necessary elements for formulating an effective campaign plan. Additionally, there is no formal requirement within the JOPS for the evaluation, review, and approval of a completed campaign plan at the strategic level.

There is a lack of recognition of the value of the campaign planning process at the strategic and operational level. Additionally, there is no single body at the strategic level responsible for effectively coordinating the efforts of the diverse OPLANS and CONPLANS produced in the JOPS at the operational level. This disjunction is a major impediment in the formulation of a campaign plan. Thus, while campaign planning is the essence of the operational art, the JOPS does not formally recognize nor adequately support it.

## SECTION V-CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

### CONCLUSIONS

A campaign plan is not a purely military endeavor. It considers diplomatic, economic, and military perspectives within a coherent framework to achieve strategic aims. As a result, Clausewitz's assertion that "...there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military

scheme to solve it" remains a valid theoretical proposition and is fundamental to the campaign planning process.

Strategic and operational level planners must think in terms of sequencing a variety of military, economic, and diplomatic events to achieve the desired strategic aim. Additionally, strategic and operational level planners must think in terms of both joint and combined operations thereby reinforcing inter-service perspectives and moving away from narrow service parochialism. The process of campaign plan formulation raises issues and areas of concern that would otherwise remain inactive until a crisis situation arose. Thus, the campaign planning process is not a purely military endeavor and is applicable to strategic and operational level planning in both peace and war.

There is a significant difference between the deliberate planning "process" of World War II and the contemporary "system" of today in relation to campaign plan formulation. The deliberate planning "process" of World War II utilized unrestrained, imaginative thought in developing strategic concepts and campaign plans while the contemporary "system" focuses on an overabundance of statistical and budgetary data, thereby restraining the planner's thought process from the initiation of the planning cycle. Additionally, the campaign planning process of World War II encompassed both joint and combined perspectives while the present JOPS does not address the crucial facet of combined operations.

The campaign planning "process" is an indispensable link between the strategic and operational levels of war. During the latter portion of World War II, the JCS formalized the campaign planning process as the vital link between the strategic and operational levels of war. There was an official relationship between the JCS

deliberate planning process and campaign plan formulation. Additionally, the role of the campaign in strategic and operational level planning was well defined. Today, the campaign planning process is not a formal part of the JOPS. As a result, while the role of the campaign plan is as critical today as it was during World War II, campaign planning expertise has long since evaporated.

Furthermore, the campaign planning "process" is just as important as the final campaign plan product. While the completed campaign plan is an important document it will certainly change, in some degree, with the first engagement. On the other hand, establishing a coherent "process" for campaign plan development allows a continuous forum for the exchange of ideas and concepts amongst a variety of different agencies and services representing a number of varying perspectives. The campaign planning "process" induces both strategic and operational level planners to expand their thinking and vision beyond a single major operation and think in terms of the sequencing of critical events.

Unrestrained thought, in the initial phases of the campaign planning process, is essential in generating resourceful solutions to complex problems. A strategic and operational level planner must not begin the campaign planning process with restraints placed upon his imagination. The initial imposition of restraints and constraints results in a compromise plan from the outset and therefore the planner does not consider all possible branches and sequels which might solve the dilemma. As a result of this initial objective analysis, planners should be able to identify critical shortfalls and areas of concern that require further detailed thought.

Furthermore, an unrestrained thought process allows a planner the freedom to pursue the myriad branches and sequels possible in the

campaign planning process. The unrestrained thinking approach initially produces a conceptual campaign plan framework. After establishing a conceptual framework, the planner then incorporates restraints and constraints into the plan rather than having to incorporate the campaign plan into the restraints and constraints.

During World War II, centralization of the campaign planning process at the strategic level within the JWPC, strengthened the position of the JCS in integrating foreign and domestic policy with military operational planning. The centralized campaign planning process overcame major joint interservice issues at the strategic and operational levels of war prior to the issuance of the outline campaign plan to the theater commanders. Centralization of planning created the campaign plan as the framework for the subsequent development of supporting major operational plans.

Additionally, in World War II the beneficiaries of the centralized strategic and operational planning process were the theater commanders. The JWPC provided theater commanders with detailed joint studies of the complexities involved, and provided joint agreement, at the highest levels of planning, as a foundation for further detailed planning and execution. The strategic concepts, studies, campaign, and outline plans produced by the JWPC gave theater commanders and planners a firm beginning for further detailed planning.

The contemporary JOPS is decentralized in that theater commanders are responsible for developing OPLANS and CONPLANS prior to any discussion of how to sequence those major operations within a campaign plan framework. The JOPS product is an OPLAN or CONPLAN for a single major operation with a short term focus. This "bottom to top" approach is the inverse of the deliberate planning process of

World War II and is not conducive to the development of a coherent campaign plan.

While the JOPS is an exhaustive process for the formulation of joint OPLANS and CONPLANS, it does not recognize campaign planning as a formal part of its deliberate planning process. The focus of the JOPS is on deployment and sustainment rather than on actual force employment planning. This lack of emphasis on employment planning seriously impairs the development of cohesive campaign plans. Therefore, as a "system", the JOPS orients on the production of an overabundance of data relating to deployment and sustainment and does not generate imaginative concepts and ideas for actual force employment.

Furthermore, the current JOPS just gets us started in the planning process of major operations and does not deal with the military conditions necessary for victory. The present JOPS does not consider the branches or sequels necessary to sequence major operations in pursuit of the strategic aims of a campaign plan. The current disjunction between the practice of the operational art and the present JOPS makes coherent campaign planning an arduous task at best. Thus, the present JOPS is inadequate in supporting the operational art.

Operational art is primarily concerned with the planning and execution of campaign plans to achieve strategic aims. A formalized campaign planning "process" is a prerequisite in application of operational art. There is a critical need to recapture the campaign planning expertise achieved in the latter part of World II and apply that expertise to planning in peacetime as well as wartime. Accomplishing this complex task requires a formalized link between

the strategic and operational levels of war in the form of a recognized campaign planning process.

### IMPLICATIONS

The current deliberate planning "system" must move away from its orientation on an overabundance of data, and constrained thought, in seeking short term solutions. It must focus on the "process" of producing imaginative ideas and concepts, through unrestrained thinking in the campaign planning process. Formalized campaign planning must function as the primary "process" for producing strategic and operational plans in both peace and war. While this is a complex task, it impels strategic and operational planners to look beyond their immediate circumstances and correlate a variety of perspectives and possibilities in relation to the achievement of strategic aims.

There is a need for centralization of the deliberate planning process at the strategic level to facilitate a campaign planning process. The present JOPS relies on decentralization of the planning process and, as a result, there is no single agency at the strategic level to orchestrate campaign planning efforts between regional theaters. The JCS needs to take an active role, at the strategic level, in the establishment, review, evaluation, and coordination of a campaign planning process. The establishment of a joint planning committee, similar to the JWPC of World War II, is one possible solution for the current dearth of campaign planning expertise.

Campaign planning is applicable in peace as well as spanning the entire spectrum of conflict from conflicts short of war, euphemistically referred to as low intensity conflicts, to large



scale, declared wars. Recognizing that a campaign plan is not a purely military endeavor, any formalized campaign planning process must incorporate diplomatic, economic, and military issues. This facet of campaign plan formulation is particularly crucial at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

While the focus of the campaign planning process during World War II was directly linked to warfighting, the challenge for any contemporary campaign planning process is to blend diplomatic, economic, and military perspectives in achieving strategic aims in an environment where large scale confrontations between conventional forces are the exception and not the rule. In conflicts short of war, such as a developing insurgency, diplomatic and economic issues are predominant. Thus, there is an increased requirement for a formalized campaign planning process to consider issues other than direct military intervention in a coherent framework.

A formalized campaign planning process is necessary to support the current doctrine which emphasizes the primacy of the operational art. A campaign planning process is vital in the translating of strategic aims into a sequencing of actions to achieve those aims. Additionally, a contemporary campaign planning process should encourage unrestrained thinking in the initial concept development stages to encompass all the possibilities. After consideration of all the possible branches and sequels, restraints and constraints will fit into the campaign plan framework rather than tailoring a campaign from the outset based on the narrow limitations of restraints and constraints.

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## GLOSSARY

ADP (Automated Data Processing)

CAS (Crisis Action System)

CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff)

COA (Course of Action)

CINCPOA (Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Area)

CINCSWPA (Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific Area)

CONPLAN ( A JOPS OPLAN in the concept format)

DOD (Department of Defense)

JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff)

JOPS (Joint Operations Planning System)

JPS (Joint Planning Staff)

JSCP (Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan)

JWPC (Joint War Plans Committee)

NCA (National Command Authority)

OPLAN (Operations Plan)

POA (Pacific Ocean Areas)

PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System)

SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces)

SWPA (Southwest Pacific Areas)

TPFDD (Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data)

WWMCCS (Worldwide Military Command and Control System)



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